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Abstract
Conventionally, we think of an increase in competition as weakly
decreasing prices, increasing the number of consumers served, thus
increasing consumer surplus, decreasing firms profits, etc. Here, we
demonstrate that, under some tame circumstances, an increase in com-
petition may lead to a price increase in a horizontally differentiated
market. We show this relationship for the petrol market in German
cities.
1 Introduction
Increased competition between firms in a market can be defined as an in-
crease in the number of firms present or, alternatively, as a decreased hori-
zontal differentiation between a constant number of firms in a fixed market.
Standard thinking about these two kinds of competition in an oligopolistic
market would suggest that an increase in competition may lead to weakly
lower prices in this market.
In contrast, oligopoly models with additional features like repeated in-
teractions, collusion, threats, or taste for variety, eventually produce a coun-
tervailing effect. But even these models in general display the conventional
competition effect as described above. So will, for example, more competi-
tion in equilibrium also lead to a decreased propensity of collusion and thus
lower prices.
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like to thank Konrad Stahl, Martin Hellwig, Andreas Irmen, Jean Tirole, Patrick Rey,
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We show in this contribution, that even in a simple setting of horizontally
differentiated goods increased competition1 may in fact lead to higher prices
without explicit communication amongst the players.
We use a one stage standard model of horizontal differentiation as in-
troduced by Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979) to lay out the theoretical
grounds. The existence of this effect has in principle been mentioned (in
particular in Salop (1979) and Economides (1989)) before, but has never
been appreciated as reasonable strategic behaviour of the players. However,
we find empirical evidence, that this effect exists in reality.
We analyze the comparative statics of the model in depth in section
3. Subsequently in section 4, we find evidence for a positive relationship
between prices and the density of firms in a market of petrol stations in
German cities.
Our theoretical model closely follows the basic setup and equilibria of
the pricing game as introduced by Salop (1979). Readers familiar with this
work are welcome to skip section 3 completely, or go to sections 3.4 and 3.5
for a review of the best response strategies of the firms and the resulting
equilibria before continuing with section 4.
2 Literature
To a large extent, the post-Hotelling (1929) literature on horizontally differ-
entiated products concerned itself with finding the existence of an equilib-
rium in a Hotelling model of positioning and pricing, ever after d’Aspremont,
Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) have shown that the original specification of
Hotelling (1929) did note have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the pric-
ing subgame for firm locations that were too close to each other. Also, for
example, Anderson (1986; 1988) and Osborne and Pitchik (1987) investi-
gate mostly the existence of equilibria. Those from this group that report
the pricing behaviour as a function of distance all have a monotone positive
relationship between the two.
On the other hand, Salop (1979) and Economides (1989) are two works
that do report the non-monotone price behaviour that we investigate here,
although these authors seem to have believed the effect to be strange and
difficult to see in reality. These papers differ from the first group in one
critical point: their models have an outside option for consumers to choose,
while the former models forced all consumers to participate in the market.
In our model—which is a direct descendant of Salop (1979)—if all consumers
were made to buy at least from one firm, the pricing behaviour would also
be monotone.
1Here, the two kinds of increased competition coincide in terms of optimizing behaviour
of the firms.
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There exists other work that also derives seemingly counter-intuitive (at
least from traditional point of view) results about the behaviour of the firms
in horizontally differentiated marketplaces, but these papers have different
settings. For example, Stahl (1982) and Schulz and Stahl (1996) study exter-
nalities from many firms in one marketplace, which may lead single-product
firms in one marketplace to charge higher prices than a multi-product mo-
nopolist. They do not look at competing marketplaces, which makes their
results different to our paper.
3 The Model
Our goal is to investigate the pricing of a duopoly in a differentiated goods
market, where the degree of differentiation is given by a transportation cost
a` la Hotelling. As reference cases, we use the pricing strategies in two
monopoly settings.
3.1 Set-up
The market is given by a Salop circle2 of circumference 2 · s. Each point
on the circle represents a differentiated good that is most preferred by a
consumer occupying that point. Consumers are uniformly distributed along
the circle, with density 1/s, which results in a constant consumer mass of
2. There are two identical firms, positioned exactly opposite each other at
0 and s. Like Salop (1979), we are interested in the analysis of the short
term behaviour in the pricing game and thus we also assume that the firms’
positions are fixed exogenously. We normalise marginal costs of production
to zero. When a consumer x consumes a good offered at y 6= x, he incurs
a disutility or transportation cost, t · |x− y|, according to the shortest arc-
length distance between x and y. Consumption of either good delivers to the
consumer a pure utility of a > 0 in monetary terms, which is then adjusted
for the price paid and the transportation cost.
Earlier work was concerned with the non-existence of pure strategy equi-
libria in similar Hotelling settings. We choose our set-up in a simple way,
such that typical problems pertaining to pure strategies3 do not occur, in
order to allow for clear presentation of our case. This relates to the amount
of firms and their symmetric position, given which, it is impossible to obtain
the hinterland of your competitor. Take firm i, which prices such that the
consumer at location of its rival, −i, just prefers −i to i. Lowering its price
by a small amount, firm i does not gain all of the consumers on the other
side of −i, because it has already been serving those consumers from the
other side of the circle. The hinterland does not exist.
2cf. Salop (1979)
3e.g., jumps in demand due to undercutting the rival’s price, leading to non-existence
of pure strategy equilibria.
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Due to the same reasoning and for simplicity of exposition we can cut
the circle in half and obtain our market as a line from 0 to s with firms
positioned on the opposite sides and consumers uniformly distributed with
density 1/s and a total mass of one.
3.2 Consumption decision
Consumers are utility maximizers and buy one or zero units of a good from
at most one of the companies present. This decision is summarised in the
conditions (1) and (2) below. If they buy zero units from the firms in ques-
tion, they buy some homogeneous outside good, which costs 0 and delivers
0 utility to every consumer, irrespective of location.
Definition 1 (Utility form) Let a, s, t ∈ R+. For the person located at
an address x between 0 and s (at a distance z0 = x or z1 = s− x from firm
0 or firm 1 respectively), when buying a good from firm i at price pi, the
indirect utility is given by the additive separable function
ux(pi, zi) = a− pi − t · zi .
Thus, given firms’ prices pi, p−i ∈ [0, a], the consumer located at x buys
product i if and only if: (a) he prefers good i to good −i,
ux(pi, zi) ≥ ux(p−i, z−i) (1)
and (b) he prefers good i to the outside option,
ux(pi, zi) ≥ 0 (2)
3.3 Aggregate demand and firms’ profits
As the consumers do not act strategically, we can map their decisions directly
into the (piece-wise linear) demand function for the firms. The firms can
capture the market from their position up to an indifferent consumer. This
consumer is either indifferent between buying the firm’s product and buying
the other product (fulfilling (1) with equality)or he is indifferent between
buying the product and not buying (fulfilling (2) with equality). Consumers
further away from the firm than the indifferent consumer either buy the other
product or do not buy at all. There either exists one indifferent consumer,
if all consumers are served or there are two indifferent consumers, if some
consumers in the middle of the market are not served.
Firms set prices pi ∈ [0, a]—a compact, convex set. Setting any price
equal to or above a would lead to demand of zero for firm i. Therefore, we
establish the upper bound a on the price set. Relaxing this assumption does
not change the results.
4
Ui(x) U−i(x)
x
0.6 s = 1
a = 1
0.7
0.3
0
a = 1
0.5
0.2
[pi = 0]
[pi = 0.3]
[pi = 0.7]
[pi = 1]
[0] [1] [2] [3]
Figure 1: Example consumer utility levels for different prices pi with fixed
parameters p−i = 0.8, a = 1, t = 0.5 and s = 1
The piece-wise demand equation for firm i is then given by the distance
from that firm to the closest indifferent consumer weighted with the density
of consumers 1/s on that part of the market.
Di(pi, p−i|a, s, t) = max
{
0︸︷︷︸
[0]
,min
{
a− pi
st︸ ︷︷ ︸
[1]
,
1
2
+
1
2st
(p−i − pi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
[2]
, 1︸︷︷︸
[3]
}}
(3)
The piece-wise linear parts of the demand can be associated with regions
of demand patterns, which are described below. An example for the demand
for firm i’s product depending on its price pi is shown in figure 1.
[0] Demand is zero if a firm prices higher than the price of its competitor
at the firm’s location
(
(pi ≥ p−i + st)∧ (p−i ≤ a− st)
)
or too high for
all consumers at (pi = a)
[1] The first interesting part of demand corresponds to firm i being a local
monopolist. A small decrease in price leads to engaging previously idle
consumers in trade; a small increase leads to him losing customers to
the outside option.
[1]-[2] The kink between parts [1] and [2]. If the firm lowers its price, it
steals the customers from the competitor; if it increases its price, some
customers switch to the outside option—not to the competitor.
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[2] This part corresponds to competitors being in “effective” competition:
the market is covered, and any change in prices leads to stealing con-
sumers from—or driving your consumers to—the competitor. This
occurs for prices pi ∈ (p−i − st, 2a− p−i − st).
[3] This part corresponds to firm i capturing the whole market, which
occurs at prices pi < p−i− st, or pi < a− st if firm −i prices itself out
of the market.
Of course, depending on the competitor’s price p−i and the parameters
a, s, and t, some of these regions may not exist at all:
• If there is no competitor (or p−i > a), then part [2] collapses.
• If p−i < a − st (low enough) and st > a, there is no part 1: even for
very high pi firm i would “effectively” compete with firm −i.
• If p−i < st or st > a, there is no (profitable) part 3: even for very small
pi > 0 firm i cannot capture the whole market from firm −i, either
because firm−i prices too low or the transport across the whole market
is too expensive.
From the demand equation (3) we get the profit function by multiplying
by the price pi: Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) = pi · Di(pi, p−i|a, s, t). We write out the
profit function covering the full space of p−i ∈ [0, a] and the parameters a,s,t
∈ R+.
Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) =

[0] 0
(
(pi ≥ p−i + st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a− st)
)
∨(pi ≥ a)
[1] a−pi
st
· pi (2a− p−i − st ≤ pi ≤ a)
∧(p−i ≥ a− st)
[2]
[
1
2 +
1
2st(p−i − pi)
]
· pi (p−i − st ≤ pi ≤ 2a− p−i − st)
∧(p−i ≤ a)
[3] pi
(
(pi ≤ p−i − st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a)
)
∨
(
(pi ≤ a− st) ∧ (p−i ≥ a)
)
(4)
Function Πi(pi, p−i|a, s, t) is quasi-concave and continuous in pi. The
positive part is strictly concave. Therefore, the function has a unique max-
imum above zero. In fact, given any quadruplet (p−i, a, s, t), the maximiser
lies either in the interior of one of the non-zero piece-wise components [1] or
[2] of the profit function, or in one of the corners of part [2]. One example
for the demand and profit function for a parameter set at which all regions
exist is depicted in figure 2.
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Figure 2: Demand and profit regions at fixed parameters p−i, a, t, and s as
in the example in figure 1
3.4 Best responses
Maximising the profit from equation (4) with respect to pi, we get firm i’s
continuous best response function pi(p−i|a, s, t). For discussion, we name
the areas of the best response function. The pieces span the space for all
parameters as shown in figure 3.
pi(p−i|a, s, t) =

GM a− st (p−i ≥ a) ∧ (st ≤
a
2 )
CM p−i − st (p−i ≤ a) ∧ (p−i ≥ 3st)
EC st+p−i2 (p−i ≤ 3st) ∧ (p−i ≤
4
3a− st)
IC 2a− st− p−i (p−i ≤
3
2a− st) ∧ (p−i ≤ a) ∧ (p−i ≥
4
3a− st)
LM a2 (st ≥
a
2 ) ∧ (p−i ≥
3
2a− st)
(5)
The parameters for the market size s between the firms and for the
relative transportation cost t always enter in the same way as a product for
the total transportation cost across the whole market st, such that we don’t
need to treat them separately from now on. We discuss the firms’ rationale
behind this best response function by letting st increase and thereby taking
us through the different regions of the best response function.
GM Global monopoly—occurs when the competing firm has totally priced
itself out of the market (p−i ≥ a) and the total transportation cost is
so low, such that the firm finds it optimal to set a price to just serve
the whole market (region [3] of the demand and of the profit equation).
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CM Capturing the whole market—also corresponds to part [3] of the de-
mand function. Here the competitor is active in the market (p−i < a),
but charges too high a price (p−i ≥ 3st) such that firm i maximises
profit in this region by charging the highest price that allows it to
capture the whole market against the price of the competitor.
EC Effective competition—the best response refers to an inner maximum
over the part [2] of demand and of profit equation. Here, the total
transportation cost is low enough relative to the reservation utility,
such that the firm engages in competition that serves every consumer
at positive utility.
IC Ineffective competition—refers to the kink [1]-[2] in the demand func-
tion and in the profit function. The firm prices such that the indif-
ferent consumer is just indifferent between buying from either firm or
not buying at all. Note that the prices in this region are strategic
substitutes: ∂pi(·)/∂p−i < 0.
LM Local monopoly—refers to inner maximum over part [1] of the demand
and profit function. The total transportation cost here is high enough,
such that the firm can ignore the presence of the competitor and set
prices in a local monopoly. Consumers in the middle remain unserved.
st32a
4
3a
1
2a
p−i
a
GM
CM EC IC LM
Figure 3: Areas of the best response function pi in p−i–st space
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3.5 Equilibrium
Solving the system of best response functions, we find that there is a unique
pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium, with an equilibrium price p∗i for
any parameter tuple (a, s, t). We characterise our equilibrium in terms of
st’s relation to a as we are interested in the comparative statics with respect
to the level of the exogenous parameters st.
p∗ =


st if st ≤ 23a
a− st2 if
2
3a < st ≤ a
a
2 if st > a
(6)
These equilibrium prices lie in three different regions of the best response
function (EC, IC, and LM)—corresponding to three different rationales for
the behaviour of the firms—depending on the transportation cost and the
distance between the firms, st. The equilibrium price of the duopoly case is
pictured with a solid line in figure 4. As reference cases we use the pricing of
the one-product monopolist (dotted line) and of a two-product monopolist
(dashed line).4 For small st, the firms engage in effective competition and
their behaviour corresponds to standard understanding of lower prices at
lower levels of transportation cost or distance. The limit (as st→ 0) of this
case is marginal cost pricing in a Bertrand competition with a homogenous
good. For very high st values, the firms maximize profits by acting as local
monopolists and setting the monopoly price a/2.
In the middle region (st ∈ [a/2, a])we see the price first overshoot the
one-product monopoly price and then return to the one-product monopoly
price with higher st.
For st ∈ [23a, a], the equilibrium lies in the region of “ineffective” com-
petition and the duopoly firms act as a two-product monopolist without
explicit communication or coordination through repeated games. They are
led solely by profit maximization through setting prices. Notably, at all of
these st, the firms price such that the indifferent consumer is exactly indiffer-
ent between the two goods and the outside option. The firms decide not to
engage in competition, instead they evade competition by jointly exploiting
the consumers as long as all consumers participate.
3.6 Discussion
We argue, that this equilibrium behaviour reflects a reasonable strategy in
practice. The rigidity of the partitioning of the market and the adjustment
over prices is directly driven by the different price elasticities of demand
for the firms. In this equilibrium, they face a discretely higher elasticity of
4Please refer to Appendix A for the computation of the reference cases.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium prices in the duopoly, and the 1-product and 2-
product monopoly reference cases
demand for price increases than for price decreases because they lose more
customers to the outside option when increasing the price, than they gain
consumers from the competitor when lowering the price.
Similarly, we can assess the effects of ineffective competition in the com-
parison of the duopoly setting to the two-product monopoly setting. In the
region of st ∈ [23a, a], the firms in the duopoly set prices like a two-product
monopolist, although they could engage in competition. Here, the market
is in fact less than twice the size of the market a one-product monopolist
would deliberately decide to serve at its profit-maximising price for the same
set of parameters. However, the mere increase in the number of firms at the
positions as described in the model on this specific st-range does not de-
crease the equilibrium prices. As compared to the one-product monopolist,
we shall even see a price increase. This effect needs to be considered, when
judging on firm concentration in such markets. The effect will be prevalent
in markets that at the same time are horizontally differentiated, show lim-
ited market expansion as reaction to lower prices in the market, and have
an outside option for the consumers.
4 Empirical model
In this section, we examine the prediction of our model that the relationship
between the equilibrium market price and the distance between the firms
is not monotonic across all distances—in particular, that it is not always
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positive. We do this by analysing the pricing behaviour of petrol stations
along the station density in different city districts in Germany, where a
district is an administrative unit at the level of a county (“Landkreis” or
“Kreisfreie Stadt” in German), between a community and a state.5
We believe that this petrol market corresponds closely to the spatial
competition as presented in our model, despite some problems discussed
briefly below. We take the station density, denoted as ζ, as a proxy for
the inverse of the distance between the firms (1/s) and we assume that the
per distance transportation cost t is equal in all cities. Thus, we look at
an equilibrium price in our model as a function of the station density ζ,
together with the two kinks at ζ ′ and ζ ′′ as depicted in figure 5.
station density ζ = 1/(st)ζ ′ = 32aζ
′′ = 1
a
p∗
2
3a
1
2a
Figure 5: Equilibrium price prediction for station density
It is clear that effective competition (to the right of ζ ′) is abundant, and
this has in fact been shown in Karle (2005), for this particular data set.
We do not believe that local monopolies exist in the market for petrol in
German city districts, which is why we do not expect to find the part of the
curve that is to the left of ζ ′′ in figure 5.
What we add to the discussion is the identification of the middle section
of “ineffective competition”: we first reject the hypothesis that the prices are
a downward-sloping function of station density across all station densities,
then we find a suitable value for a kink point ζ ′, and estimate a two-part
connected linear curve around this kink.
To bridge the gap between the model of section 3 and our empirical
work, we need to assume that consumers and stations are in fact distributed
5City districts therefore contain a large city and its closest surroundings.
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uniformly within the district, that consumers do frequent the closest station,
ceteris paribus, and that districts have zero interaction with each other.
Of course, these are strict assumptions. For one, consumers’ locations are
typically not given by their physical address, but rather by their every-day
route to and from work (which furthermore may be in a different district).
On the other hand, we believe that any distortion from these problems
should enter in the same way irrespective of the observed station density.
Therefore, these distortions should at worst hinder our analysis and at best
have no effect, but they should not help us identify the upward-sloping part
of the curve around the kink ζ ′ in figure 5.
4.1 Data
We use daily German petrol station price data collected for 78 days starting
April 13, 2005, from a service website for retail petrol price comparisons.6
Some of the original sample entries had missing observations for our
variables of interest. For example, Sunday and Saturday prices were largely
not reported by the stations, so we only include weekday prices in the sample.
While there were some observations from the rural districts, only the city
districts ensure that the sample observations are representative of all the
petrol stations in a district. At the end, we are left with a consistent sub-
sample of the original data that contains daily price observations for 807
petrol stations in 93 major German city districts for 63 days.
The stations are divided into brand types: Premier-brand or A-type (e.g.,
Shell, BP), second-tier or B-type, and independent or C-type, according to
their differentiation in the eyes of consumers.
We treat the districts as markets in the sense of section 3. Our depen-
dent variable is the average retail price of one litre of petrol in a district,
for each day and brand type, which gives us 14, 984 observations. We need
to control for the changes in variables that may influence consumer pref-
erences (the brand type, income) and marginal cost (local wholesale price
per litre), as these are held constant in the model of section 3. In fact, the
local wholesale price changed dramatically during the sample period, while
income is different across the districts. We thus consider as independent
variables: station density in a district, income per capita in a district, the
brand type and the local wholesale price.
The income is measured as local GDP per capita in a city; the local GDP
is taken from “Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der La¨nder 2003”.
The wholesale price is the daily price reported for the petrol spot market in
Rotterdam, by Energie-Informationsdienst; we take a 5-day moving average
of this price to capture the adjustment lag of the retail price to the wholesale
price changes. The local wholesale price is then the moving average of the
6For a detailed data description, see Karle (2005).
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Rotterdam price adjusted for time-persistent local differences, which are
reported weekly by Europe Oil-telegram. The station density, ζ, is measured
as the average number of stations per square kilometre in a district.
4.2 Testing for negative relationship between prices and sta-
tion density
Suppose we know the value ζ ′ in figure 5. In order to test for negative
price–station density relationship, we first partition the 14, 984 observations
into two parts according to the kink station density, ζ¯ = ζ ′: with n1(ζ¯)
observations to the left of ζ¯, and n2(ζ¯) = 14, 984 − n1(ζ¯) to the right. We
then use OLS to estimate a two-part connected linear curve with a kink at
ζ¯, which gives us two slope parameters for the curves on the right and left
partitions. Last, we test the equality of these two parameters using a Chow
test, which is stated formally below.
Of course, we cannot compute ζ ′. Instead, we repeat our estimation and
test pragmatically for different assumed values of ζ¯. We start with ζ¯ = 0.25
and move down in increments of 0.005 until ζ¯ = 0.09.
To estimate the two curves with the constraint that they meet at ζ¯, we
transform the station density to be around 0 with:
adjusted station density = station density− ζ¯, (7)
which permits us an estimation of one intercept for both parts of the curve
in a single OLS regression. Now we can fit the two-part connected linear
model, which allows for different parameters in different partitions:
[
p1
p2
]
=
[
i X1 0 Z1 0
i 0 X2 0 Z2
]
·


α
β
γ
δ1
δ2

+
[
1
2
]
, (8)
where p1 and p2 are the n1× 1 and n2× 1 vectors of the dependent variable
observations (the average retail petrol prices in a district, for each day and
brand type) in the left and right partitions, respectively; i is a vector of 1’s;
X1 and X2 are respectively n1×1 and n2×1 (left and right partition) matri-
ces of station density observations; Zj is an nj×4 matrix of control variables
for two partitions (with j = 1, 2 and the controls being: moving average of
the Rotterdam wholesale price adjusted for local differences, income, and
two dummies for brand types A and B); α is the price at the connection of
the two lines (corresponds to the intercept since X1 contains only negative
values after the transformation); β and γ are the slope coefficients for the
left and right partitions (X1 and X2, respectively); δj is the 4× 1 vector of
13
coefficients for Zj, j = 1, 2; and 1,2’s are the disturbances (assumed i.i.d.).
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We allow for different effects of the Z control variables in different parti-
tions, by partitioning all the Z control variables according to the same kink
station density ζ¯. Our hypothesised relationship between the station density
and price is different for different partitions, but the model of section 3 is
silent about the effects of independent variables other than station density.
There is no reason to assume that the effect of, for example, marginal cost
on price is the same in the ranges of effective and “ineffective” competi-
tion, since in the latter part the pricing is driven by the kink feature of the
demand curve.
Given the empirical model in equation (8), our testable hypothesis is
H0 : β = γ. (9)
The data analysis shows that at any ζ¯, the right partition has a negative
relationship between the price and station density. If the data can identify
the part of the curve that is between ζ ′′ and ζ ′ in Figure 5, then our test will
reject the equality of slopes for the right and left partitions around ζ¯ = ζ ′.
Furthermore, the slope of the left partition should be positive.
We assume that the disturbances have a zero mean and are uncorrelated
with any of the regressors.
To cope with potential heteroscedasticity, we calculate the standard er-
rors using the White covariance matrix, such that our estimation and tests
are heteroscedasticity-robust.
4.3 Results
For all tested kinks points ζ¯ ≤ 0.14, we can reject the null hypothesis of
equal slope coefficients in both partitions with at least 98% confidence. Fur-
thermore, the slope in the left partition is positive and significant at a 1%
level for all kink points 0.105 < ζ¯ ≤ 0.135, and positive and significant at a
10% level for all kinks ζ¯ ≤ 0.105 and at a 5% level for ζ¯ = 0.14. The model
fits equally well for all the tested kink points (R2 is slightly above 56%).
For large values of ζ¯, we cannot reject the null. Both slope coefficients
are negative and significant and cannot be said to differ. The F -statistics
and the associated p-values of the above tests for all ζ¯ are given in Table 2
in the appendix B.
Thus, we have shown that the relationship between station density and
prices is not monotonic. In particular, the relationship is positive for low
station density, and becomes negative after a certain kink point. We con-
clude that this turning station density is around ζ¯ = 0.135 (the highest
tested potential kink point to deliver positive and significant slope of the
left partition and still leave many observations to the left).
7Our estimation and tests are robust to exclusion of the Z controls. We do not report
the results here, but they can be obtained directly from the authors.
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Finally, we fit the curve in equation (8) for ζ¯ = 0.135. The results of the
regression are given in table 1. To illustrate the relationship, we picture the
fitted price curve against station density in figure 6.
Table 1: Estimation results of equation (8) with ζ¯ = 0.135
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
station density≤ ζ¯ 0.102∗∗ (0.012)
station density> ζ¯ -0.008∗∗ (0.002)
marginal cost1 0.965
∗∗ (0.008)
marginal cost2 0.953
∗∗ (0.007)
income1 0.000
∗∗ (0.000)
income2 0.000
∗∗ (0.000)
A1 0.020
∗∗ (0.001)
A2 0.016
∗∗ (0.000)
B1 0.013
∗∗ (0.001)
B2 0.006
∗∗ (0.000)
Intercept 0.886∗∗ (0.002)
N 14984
R2 0.566
F (10,14973) 2218.716
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
5 Conclusion
In this contribution we showed that increased competition may lead to higher
prices in a simple model of horizontal differentiation. We especially analysed
the comparative statics of this effect and we argued that it represents a
rationalisable strategy of firms. Furthermore, we showed its existence in the
retail gasoline market in Germany.
The set of markets in which this effect surfaces is, as usual, limited but
exists, as we have shown in the empirical section. The market needs to be
horizontally differentiated, it needs to have an outside option for all potential
buyers, and its expansion due to lower prices needs to be limited. A strictly
kinked demand curve, as in our simple example, is in fact not a necessary
prerequisite, as one can show for a family of locally smoothed-out demand
curves. Clearly also this model is only powerful with restricted entry and
exit to the market, as we have for example in the short term examination
that is done in the empirical part of the paper.
The model is general enough in its description of consumers and pro-
ducers that it can also be applied to increased integration of international
producer-supplier markets, which occurs when improved communication
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technologies and opening of the local markets reduce the perceived trans-
portation costs8 between previously distant agents. Take the product to
be an intermediate input, the two producers to be the suppliers of this in-
put, and the consumers as the manufacturers of a final good. As long as
this producer-supplier market fulfils the conditions described in the previ-
ous paragraph, one of the model’s predictions is that for a certain exogenous
fall in the perceived transportation costs (i.e., more world integration) the
manufacturers experience higher costs of intermediate inputs in the short
run.
From a competition policy point of view, for the relevant markets with
features as above, competition authorities need to consider this behaviour
when judging on market concentration as classical concentration measures
might be misleading, if they purely measure market share ratios of the par-
ticipating firms.
Furthermore, the firms’ strategy of ‘evading competition’ and accommo-
dating to a shared market even without explicit communication needs to
be appreciated as a reasonable and profit maximizing strategy of players in
markets, that seemed to follow standard intuition of competition.
8These can include real transportation costs plus information costs, etc.
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A Reference cases
We compare the equilibrium price of our duopoly game to two reference
cases: A one-product monopoly and a two-product monopoly.
A.1 One-product monopoly
One way to look at one-product monopoly is to fix the price of firm −i in the
duopoly profit equation (4) so as to price it out of the market: p−i = pˆ−i > a.
Then, the regions [0] and [2] will disappear from the demand function (for
prices 0 < pi < a), and we are left with
ΠMi (pi|a, s, t) =
{
[1] a−pi
st
· pi pi > a− st
[3] pi pi ≤ a− st
(10)
Solving the maximisation problem for the monopoly, we get the equilib-
rium prices as
pM∗ =
{
a− st if st ≤ a2
a
2 if
a
2 < st
(11)
A.2 Two-product monopoly
The two-product monopoly can be computed in the same framework, as one
firm setting prices pi and p−i simultaneously. The firm will use symmetric
prices as, without fixed cost for the second product, it is always better to
supply the upper half of the market line with the product located at the
upper end than to supply it from the lower end of the market and vice
versa. This leaves more utility with the consumers, which can be extracted
through higher prices. Thus we get the symmetric prices pi = p−i and the
profit is given by
Π2Mi (pi|a, s, t) =
{
[1] a−pi
st
· 2 · pi pi > a−
st
2
[3] pi pi ≤ a−
st
2
(12)
Solving for the equilibrium prices yields
p∗2M =
{
a− st2 if st < a
a
2 if a ≤ st
(13)
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B Chow Test results
Table 2: The F -statistic and the associated p-values for the Chow test for
the parameter stability at different ζ¯’s
increment F p R2
.25 2.218132 .136419 .5654151
.245 2.094088 .1478908 .5654117
.24 2.280698 .131014 .564586
.235 2.1578 .1418687 .5645825
.23 2.038049 .1534272 .564579
.225 1.921477 .1657146 .5645757
.22 2.729819 .0985114 .5672181
.215 2.879594 .0897294 .5672224
.21 2.79763 .0944247 .5656854
.205 1.596892 .2063639 .5622169
.2 1.499953 .2206978 .5622142
.195 .1695287 .6805369 .56202
.19 .0887485 .7657784 .5620067
.185 .0685921 .7934014 .5620061
.18 1.978202 .1596008 .5626864
.175 2.476331 .1155927 .5624058
.17 2.615331 .1058565 .562429
.165 2.786674 .0950722 .5624336
.16 3.745212 .0529778 .5608998
.155 2.042018 .1530274 .5609509
.15 5.64495 .0175182 .5626013
.145 2.282735 .1308421 .5620812
.14 9.525839 .0020297 .5621582
.135 79.31693 5.89e-19 .5661687
.13 82.42374 1.23e-19 .5652712
.125 53.00962 3.48e-13 .5628271
.12 52.13296 5.44e-13 .5628073
.115 40.56149 1.96e-10 .5638012
.11 12.34939 .0004424 .5638718
.105 6.764859 .0093062 .563678
.1 6.484803 .01089 .5636718
.095 6.206994 .0127354 .5636657
.09 15.73746 .0000731 .5644021
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